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The overall goal of this thesis is the evaluation of The Gym Group’s feasibility as a potential leveraged buyout target. In the beginning, the firm was inspected from different angles, the market
thoroughly analyzed and the company’s position in the market assessed. In the following, a comprehensive appraisal of influencing factors on its financial performance was conducted and
growth drivers forecasted to come up with three different cases of how the firm might develop. This knowledge was quantified and the company subsequently valued using a comparable
company, a precedent transaction, a DCF valuation method as well as an LBO model. Additionally, an investment thesis and future strategy regarding the operations of the target and the
responsibilities of a PE fund, such as sourcing and an exit strategy, were developed. Finally, potential returns were calculated for the different scenarios. The third part comprises the capital
structure, financial forecast, LBO, returns, exit strategy and due diligence.
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6     I Capital Structure
50January 3rd, 2020Strictly Confidential
Comments
§ As typical in Private Equity, the transaction is levered and partially financed with debt
§ The debt is divided into two major seniority levels. Term loan A, B, C and the Capex facility are senior 
and have the highest seniority from all financing sources but are still junior to the revolver. The 
Revolver is the most senior facility. The Mezzanine is subordinated to all senior loans. Senior loans are 
characterized by cash payment interests, which are lower compared to more junior financing sources 
as those are exposed to higher risks
§ The Revolver serves to provide the firm with short term liquidity and is majorly used to serve all debt 
covenants. The interest is composed of an annual interest rate of 2.45% for the draw down facility and 
a 2.0% interest rate p.a. for the undrawn capital committed by the bank
§ The Capex facility of £95,837,000 is mainly needed to fund the planned acquisitions in year 2021 and 
2022 for the implied costs to integrate the acquired gyms. It will be drawdown for 2 years and paid 
back the following 2 years starting from 2021 onwards. It has a higher margin than the other senior 
loans (4.75%) and a commitment fee of 2.38% p.a. for the draw down period
§ Term loan A is amortizing and has a maturity of 6 years with a margin of 2.90% + GBP 6-month 
LIBOR, which is at 0.85%(1) resulting in a total yearly interest rate of 3.75% and an available amount of 
£51,813,000
§ While term loan A is amortizing, B and C are characterized by bullet payments due in 7 and 8 years 
from the start of the investment horizon. They have margins of 2.90% and 3.40% respectively
§ The Mezzanine debt includes a Payment In Kind (PIK) element of 6.5%-interest, which compounds 
over the 9 years and paid at year 6, accordingly the cash element of 7.35%-interest. This makes it the 
most expensive financing source, which is why it is the smallest component in the financial structure
§ All senior loans will be underwritten by banks. Even though it is one of the more expensive 
underwriting options, underwritten deals have the highest certainty as banks guarantee the entire 
commitment. Additionally, those deals are characterized by a high level of confidentiality
§ All loans are protected by financial covenants. As the fund will exit in 2024, no covenants will be 
breached. Shrinking Net Debt / EBITDA over the investment period shows a clear deleveraging effect. 
Interest coverage ratio throughout the years is steadily above 1.0x. This shows high credibility for The 
Gym Group and no concerns about the ability to service debt interest. Cash coverage ratio in year 




2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Cash 3,053 3,079 3,609 38,620 38,950 44,301 44,680 
Cash Flow 26 26 28 34,807 330 5,352 378 
Cash Cover 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 2.7x 1.0x 1.3x 1.0x
Interest Cover 6.8x 8.8x 9.0x 8.6x 11.2x 17.1x 22.8x
Net Debt / EBITDA 3.5x 2.6x 2.8x 2.1x 1.3x 0.7x 0.1x
Debt Type
Debt Structure Term (Years) Amort. x EBITDA Amount Margin Interest rate
Revolver 6 Revolving 12,000 2.45%  
CAPEX Facility 4 Amort. 95,837 4.75%
Senior debt
Term Loan A 6 Amort. 1.5x 51,813 2.90% 3.75%
Term Loan B 7 Bullet 1.5x 51,813 2.90% 3.75%
Term Loan C 8 Bullet 1.5x 51,813 3.40% 4.25%
Mezzanine 9 Bullet 0.8x 27,634
PIK Element 6.50%
Cash Element 6.50% 7.35%
A Well-Defined Capital Structure Allows for High Institutional Returns…
Leverage Structure
Notes: (1) Average of FY 2018; (2) Interest Cover minimum between 20% and 25% depending in the year; (3) Cash cover minimum 1.0x
(2)
(3)
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Benchmarking towards peersComments
Covenants Analysis – Interest Cover
§ Even though The Gym Group is intended to be acquired through a leveraged buy out, 
its debt to equity ratio would be still significantly below industry peers 
§ The leverage ratio will be 41% at acquisition date compared to the industry median of 
56%
§ This gives the company a competitive advantage in financing and especially in 
negotiations with landlords regarding conditions and auctions of property lease 
contracts
§ The degree of leverage was determined by analyzing The Gym Groups cash flows 
regarding its robustness and predictability. Since the companies operations are resilient 
and yield significant cash generation, cash flows requirements will be satisfied.  
Additionally, the companies hard assets have been tested on their quality. Since The 
Gym Group has lease contracts over 15 years and is buying its gym equipment, those 
assets fulfill the required conditions and represent a good basis for collateral
§ The covenant analysis clearly reflects that the cash flows of the company are sufficient 
enough to serve the debt well
§ The bank grants the gym group an interest coverage ratio of 20% at the beginning of 
the investment period, which is strictly increased to 25% over the period. This financing 
approach shows a rather conservative approach of the bank. However, as The Gym 
Group will not rupture the covenants in any case
§ Further covenants such as cash cover are also applied and strictly complied with. 
Nevertheless, the revolver is drawn regularly in the first few years, especially to 
maintain the cash coverage
§ Despite a conservative financing level with corresponding covenants, the business case 
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…Benchmarked against and Aligned with Comparable Companies‘ Leverage Ratios
Debt Structure Comparison
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Comments Equity Envy Bridge
§ Aligning the incentives between the management and the fund is a key factor in order to successfully 
implement the value creation strategy. Since The Gym Group is already following a successful path, very 
strong incentives are required for the management to surpass expectations and excel at their performance.
§ The alignment is achieved through an appropriate remuneration package which enables, in case of success, 
a significant cash out of the management and is in line with the funds returns. Even if the returns for 
management can be very high, it is encouraged to follow the compensation plan to achieve outstanding 
results.
§ Besides having a fixed salary, The Gym Group’s senior management Richard Darwin (CEO) and Mark 
George (CFO) will be advised to co-invest with sweet equity by rolling over 300% of their capital gains due to 
current equity. It is crucial for the management team to have “skin in the game” to raise the motivation levels 
to the highest degree possible. 
§ The management will be supported by the fund in investing these high amounts by being granted partial 
loans. If the management also believes in attractive growth opportunities for the target, they will be grateful 
for the opportunity to profit from the success of The Gym Group.
§ Even if granting 21% of equity to the Management is fairly generous, it is believed that this is the best way to 
incentivize the decision makers and ensure high ambitions. The management will have to pay  £520k for 
their stake. In the flat case, they will receive £220.4m in return with an exit in 2024.
§ The overall equity structure results in £260.5m and therefore 7.5x EBITDA. It comprises c.59% of sources
EV- Equity bridge In £k
Enterprise value 414,504 
- Debt 80,065 
+ Cash 3,027 
- Other deferred liabilities 12,082 
- Warrants / Stockoptions 0  
Equity Value before Employee Trust 325,384 
Management roll-over bridge In £k
Management cash in 1,183 
Tax rate ( for capital gain) 20.0%
Management cash in net taxes 946 
Reivested in firm 300%
Amount reinvested in firm 2,838 
Thereof sweet equity 520 
Rollover 2,318 
Equity Split
Payment of Management for Sweet Equity 520 
Stake as Return for Payment 20%
Institutional Ordinary shares 80%
Value of Ordinary shares 2080
Total Equity 260,447
Fixed Return instrument 257,847
FRI and Ordinary shares 259,927
FRI shares 99.2%
Ordinary shares 0.8%
Management roll-over 2,318 
FRI shares 2,300 
Ordinary shares 19 
Institutional amount 257,608 
FRI 255,547
Ordinary shares 2,061 
Equity Structure
Equity Structure Amount x EBITDA %-Distribution
Fixed Return Instrument 257,847 7.5x
Institutional Investors 255,547 7.4x 99.108%
Management 2,300 0.1x 0.892%
Ordinary Equity 2,600 0.1x
Institutional Investors 2,061 0.1x 79.286%
Management 19 0.0x 0.714%
Sweet Equity 520 0.0x 20.000%
Total Equity 260,447 7.5x
The Equity Structure is Intended to Motivate the Management and Enhance Returns
Equity Structure
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OverviewComments on Sources
§ The deal is financed with 41.3% debt and 
58.7% equity 
§ This capital structure reflects a 5.3x 
leverage on 2018 EBITDA, which is 
suitable regarding industry average, cash 
flows, enterprise value and hard assets
§ Term loan A, B, C are senior over the 
mezzanine and the equity. Those loans 
are characterized by low cost and low 
risk, since they are the most senior 
financing securities
§ While term loan A is amortizing over 6 
years tranche B, C and the mezzanine 
capital  have a maturity of 7, 8 and 9 
years respectively and include bullet 
payments (to be made when due)
§ The equity is split in two different types. 
The sub-ordinated Fixed Return 
Instrument (FRI) and the ordinary equity, 
which comprises the institutional strip of 
79% and the remaining 21% is sweet 
equity for the management
§ Overall equity comprises 7.5x EBITDA
§ The Debt to Equity ratio at time of 
acquisition is 70%
Comments on Uses
§ As previously mentioned within the 
valuation part, the company is valued at 
12.0x of 2018s EBITDA at acquisition 
which implies an enterprise value of 
£414,504,000
§ Besides the Acquisition price, funding 
needs to cover the administrative costs 
of the transaction
§ Administrative costs comprise fees for 
advisory, due diligence and arrangement 
of debt
§ Assuming typical transaction fees of 7% 
of the enterprise value, leads to costs of 
£29,015,000
§ Overfunding for strategic expenses 
throughout the investment period is not 
needed since the company is expected 
to generate enough cash to fund those 
costs
§ Total uses for the investment are 
£443,519,300
Sources  of Fund £k x EBITDA % EBITDA Equity Split Uses of Fund % EBITDA £k
Senior debt
Term Loan A 51,813 1.5x 11.7%
EBITDA   
2018 34,542 
Term Loan B 51,813 1.5x 11.7% Multiple 12.0x




Mezzanine 27,634 0.8x 6.2% Fees 7.0% 29,015 
Total debt 183,073 5.3x 41.3% Advisory Fee 2.0% 8,290 
Banking Fee 2.0% 8,290 
Equity Due Diligence 3.0% 12,435 
Fixed Return Instrument 257,847 7.5x
Institutional Investors 255,547 7.4x 99.108%
Management 2,300 0.1x 0.892%
Ordinary Equity 2,600 0.1x
Institutional Investors 2,061 0.1x 79.286%
Management 19 0.0x 0.714%
Sweet Equity 520 0.0x 20.000%
Total Equity 260,447 7.5x 58.72%
Total sources 443,519 12.8x 100.00% 100.00% Total Uses 12.8x 443,519.3
Leading to a Comprehensive Sources and Uses Strategy
Sources and Uses
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7     I Financial Forecast & LBO
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§ Personal Trainer Income is 0.7% of overall revenue in 2018 and will increase by 0.5pp p.a. until 2025, due to 
envisaged 1.5k+ additional personal trainers in the part-time model(1). This PT income will grow from 1.2% to 4.2% 
of overall revenue throughout the investment period
§ Other Income will be constantly 1% of overall revenue 
§ Price increases of 2% annually assumed for all prices and costs in order to account for expected inflation
§ According to the cohortization(2) of incurring revenues it is assumed that a newly opened gym is a large box gym 
and will serve 5000 members in the 3rd year after opening. In case of an average organic opening it will it will serve 
1200 members after the 1st year and 2500 after the 2nd. The implied churn rate is already considered in the 
conservative estimation of 5000 members in a mature gym
§ Forecast for all cases: Base Case: Investment strategy does not apply and company is not able to gain substantial 
market share due to bottleneck in the pipeline of commercial real estates. Flat Case: Investment strategy works 
assuming moderate results. Management case: Investment strategy outperforms moderate assumptions
Revenue Assumptions Cost Assumptions
§ The number of FTEs will remain steady throughout all cases, 3 per gym equivalent to current ratio per gym
§ COGS: No improvements in payment and call center costs throughout investment strategy to be realized (1.4% of 
revenue)
§ Wages & Salaries: Will remain steady with a small adjustment for inflation each year. As salaries are already in 
the low-wage segment and further cuts would harm quality of employees tremendously
§ Cost of Inventory: Consists out of small gym gadgets (P&L expensed and not capitalized) such as training balls 
etc., which will stay the same for each gym. Therefore, the median is used as a proxy and it is assumed that this 
ratio will maintain over the investment period (£300 per gym p.a.). All other inventory and initial fit out is 
incorporated in the fit-out capex with £1.3m per gym
§ Other operating costs: Are assumed to grow in line with revenue, 18.2% of revenue consisting out core business 
related costs including partial overhead expenses
§ Costs for part-time Personal Trainers: Accounted on P&L as running restructuring costs with a future estimate of 
£1mio. p.a. infinitely.
§ Maintenance Capex: Is assumed to be 6.5% of revenue based on its historical value, compromising maintenance 
for sites/facilities and equipment
§ Expansion Capex attr. to PP&E: Until end of 2018 split is calculated for correct PP&E calculation: From 2019 
onwards it comprises conversion and fit-out of costs for newly opened gyms as well as the acquisition price, if 
applicable. For more detailed information please have a look into the expansion schedule within the model
§ Depreciation: Average historic PP&E depreciation throughout the last 3 years was taken into consideration for 
forecasting future rates
§ Tax: UK corporate tax rate of 19.3% is applied
§ Lease Costs: To estimate the lease costs properly an index for an average UK large box gym is created, that 
accounts for a Y-o-Y price 2% increase to set off inflation. In order to receive the appropriate lease costs per 
annum every region in the UK a location factor is implied to account for a premium or discount of the local rent 
towards the UK benchmark. The weighted average according to the factors and the index will lead to the 
appropriate portfolio lease costs. As past acquisitions of gyms have aligned rental costs to market rent, it is 
assumed that rental costs for organic and inorganic gyms are identical
§ Other fixed property costs, are operating asset costs and increase proportional with lease costs
§ Auditors remuneration is a fixed rate with 0.2% of revenue
§ Acquired EBITDA: Costs structure between The Gym Group and acquired gyms is assumed to be similar and 
therefore EBITDA estimation is a result of considered to be fair proxies
§ Fit-out Capex: According to H1 2019 report, this position is expected to be between £1.3m-1.4m per organic 
opened site, as the investment thesis, compromises not to improve efficiency in fit-out of new gyms 
§ Site conversion Capex: Is dependent on several factors such as size, condition and location. According to the 
investment thesis no efficiency improvements in conversion costs are assumed. (easyGym 312k per site, Lifestyle 
470k per site)
§ Financials of acquisitions: Since both targets do not disclose details about the gym club division, data was 
generated via benchmarking of former acquisitions/peers and implied via backward induction. Nevertheless, cost 
synergies through overhead reduction is implied and accounted for in the model. Both Acquisitions are assumed to 
imply goodwill and the transaction will take place in 2021 and 2022, if relevant
§ Inorganically acquired gyms will be partially restructured after acquisition to be set to the The Gym Group standard 
and it is assumed that, including the member roll-over, an average of 1,750 members in the 1st year and 
3,500 in the 2nd year are served within one gym
Inorganic Expansion Assumptions
Notes: (1) The personal trainer rental income is estimated in dependence on the new PT model (employment on a 12-hour basis and option to “rent” space on 
top of that; (2) The cohortization refers to the initial opening of the gym and the time to envisaged maturity
General Assumptions are Inteded to Represent a Realistic Fundament
Assumptions Overview
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Overview
§ The fraction of members with a LiveIt membership will 
increase from 11.7% in 2018 to 30% in 2025 (average price 
per month in 2019: £22.80). The remaining members have 
a DoIt membership (average price per month in 2019: 
£17.14)
§ In the flat case, organic gym openings of 109 facilities 
until 2025 are assumed. Additionally, there are 45 new 
gyms derived from acquisition activities. Forecasted 
membership growth is rooted in the overall market 
growth of 9% and additional gain in market share of 
TGG
§ Acquired revenue in 2021 is based on the acquisitions 
of JD gyms and in 2022 on the asset deal with Everlast 
fitness. Future revenue is incorporated within the forecast 
of the cohortization schedule
§ Implied cost synergies due to acquisitions are based on 
overhead reduction for redundant platform costs and are 
fully accounted in the year of the acquisition. Those cost 
solely incurred with the acquisition of JD gyms (asset deal 
has no platform costs) and are considered with c.£3.5m.
§ Lease rentals are dependent on the number of new gyms 
(through inorganic and organic growth)
§ Marketing costs are assumed to be constant at 6% of 
revenues. Marketing activities are crucial to reach 
facility matureness in the desired period. Further, the 
brand awareness and emotional connection need to be 
increased due to higher density of facilities which leads 
to a higher competition between low-cost players.
§ EBITDA margins are increasing from 31% in 2019 to 
40% in 2025. Main reasons for the improvement are the 
progressive maturation of newly opened gyms and the 








Growth Opportunities are Materialized in Strong Top and Bottom Line Improvements
Income Statement
FYE 31/12 in £k 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
# gyms 158                     175                     192                     241                     269                     284                     298                     312                     
# members (in k) 724                     748                     853                     994                     1,155                  1,306                  1,399                  1,472                  
Revenue 123,884             164,995             194,115             258,373             290,615             326,983             361,645             395,022             
Revenue growth 35.6% 33.2% 17.6% 33.1% 12.5% 12.5% 10.6% 9.2%
Membership Income 121,515             161,419             188,938             226,122             269,919             313,357             344,766             374,611             
Personal Trainer  Rental Income 875                     1,990                  3,312                  5,700                  7,865                  10,484               13,404               16,616               
Other Income 1,494                  1,585                  1,865                  2,483                  2,792                  3,142                  3,475                  3,796                  
Acquired revenue -                           -                           -                           24,068               10,038               -                           -                           -                           
thereof natural revenue n.m. 98,106               101,279            104,906            108,077            111,414            115,009            119,435            
thereof organic revenue n.m. 37,016               57,559               79,657               102,127            125,310            148,426            173,597            
thereof inorganic revenue n.m. 29,873               35,277               49,742               70,372               90,258               98,210               101,990            
Cost of Sales (1,007)                (2,347)                (2,761)                (3,676)                (4,134)                (4,652)                (5,145)                (5,620)                
Gross Profit 122,877             162,648             191,354             254,697             286,480             322,331             356,500             389,403             
SG&A (88,335)              (111,579)            (127,035)            (175,040)            (187,411)            (198,268)            (215,961)            (232,269)            
Employee Expenses (16,784)              (22,084)              (24,714)              (31,641)              (36,024)              (38,793)              (41,520)              (44,340)              
Lease rentals (22,963)              (29,065)              (32,479)              (35,711)              (42,980)              (47,214)              (51,095)              (54,263)              
Cost of inventory (46)                      (59)                      (65)                      (81)                      (90)                      (95)                      (100)                    (105)                    
Auditors remuneration (224)                    (298)                    (351)                    (467)                    (525)                    (591)                    (654)                    (714)                    
Marketing costs (7,178)                (9,900)                (11,647)              (15,502)              (17,437)              (19,619)              (21,699)              (23,701)              
Other fixed property costs (14,711)              (18,181)              (20,317)              (22,339)              (26,886)              (29,535)              (31,962)              (33,944)              
Other operating costs (24,085)              (30,993)              (36,463)              (48,533)              (54,589)              (61,420)              (67,931)              (74,201)              
SG&A of acquisition targets -                           -                           -                           (16,272)              (6,787)                -                           -                           -                           
Other operating Items (2,343)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (4,493)                (2,093)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                
Acquisition costs (644)                    -                           -                           (1,919)                (600)                    -                           -                           -                           
Integration costs (460)                    -                           -                           (1,574)                (492)                    -                           -                           -                           
Restructuring costs (1,239)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                (1,000)                
EBITDA 34,542               51,069               64,318               79,657               99,069               124,063             140,539             157,134             
EBITDA margin 27.9% 31.0% 33.1% 30.8% 34.1% 37.9% 38.9% 39.8%
thereof natural EBITDA n.m. 30,366               33,558               32,343               36,843               42,273               44,694               47,510               
thereof organic EBITDA n.m. 11,457               19,072               24,559               34,815               47,545               57,680               69,055               
thereof inorganic EBITDA n.m. 9,246                 11,689               15,335               23,989               34,246               38,165               40,570               
Depreciation (19,710)              (24,248)              (28,517)              (33,106)              (54,024)              (57,321)              (60,936)              (66,633)              
Amortization (2,051)                (5,447)                (7,372)                (9,332)                (11,970)              (14,294)              (16,999)              (19,771)              
EBIT 12,781               21,373               28,429               37,219               33,075               52,448               62,604               70,731               
Interest Income 22                       26                       26                       28                       179                     330                     354                     378                     
Interest Expenses (1,752)                (7,496)                (7,296)                (8,850)                (11,336)              (10,743)              (7,889)                (6,521)                
EBT 11,051               13,903               21,159               28,398               21,918               42,034               55,069               64,588               
Tax expenses (2,127)                (2,676)                (4,073)                (5,467)                (4,219)                (8,092)                (10,601)              (12,433)              
Tax rate 19.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.3% 19.3%
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Revenue split
§ Natural revenue comprises sales from existing gyms (prior to 
2019) whereas organic revenue comes from organically opened 
gyms throughout the investment period. Inorganic revenue is 
revenue from inorganically opened gyms
§ Until 2021 inorganic revenue of Lifestyle fitness and easyGym
sites is stable. From 2021 onwards, the share of sales 
contributed by inorganic opened sites is increasing due to 
the rising matureness of the acquired JD gyms and Everlast 
gyms. In 2024 it is expected to be 27% of revenue.
§ As more and more additional gyms will be opened 
throughout the investment period, natural revenue 
contribution is decreasing to 32% in 2024
§ The biggest share of sales with 41% in 2024 will be from 
organic opened sites as this growth approach is central to 
increase memberships
§ EBITDA development throughout the investment period is 
expected to be solid
§ The biggest contribution in the increased EBITDA is rooted in 
the impressive top-line growth (revenue increase)
§ Employee expenses, lease rentals and fixed property costs 
(as % of revenue) are expected to decrease on average. This 
means that besides increased revenue, EBITDA growth also 
comes from operational/marginal improvement. This is due to 
improved economies of scale which can be achieved through 
passive improved efficiency regarding costs per member per gym
§ EBITDA cumulative annual growth rate from 2019 to 2024 is 










Lease rentals Marketing costs Fixed Property
costs
Revenue increase EBITDA 2024
In £ million 

















2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E
Natural revenue Organic revenue Inorganic revenue
…enhanced through EBITDA Improvement Mainly Rooted in Revenue Expansion
Income Statement
Notes: (1) 2024 is envisaged exit year
(1)
(1)
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Comments Overview
§ Net property, plant and equipment will increase 
straight line according to the 14 to 17 new site 
openings each year and the assumed fit-out and 
site-conversion CAPEX per gym that mainly drives 
the position. Acquisitions in 2021 and 2022 are also 
clearly reflected, respectively
§ Net intangibles increase with the take-over of The Gym 
Group, implying a c.£179m goodwill in 2019 and 
further goodwill is respectively paid due to 
acquisitions in 2021 and 2022. In addition, the balance 
sheet items grow steadily over the investment period, 
and as the customer base grows, so does the contract 
and customer list. The last three-year average per gym 
was chosen as forecast. The constant IT CAPEX of 
3.5% of revenue also shoves net intangibles. Further 
parts of net intangibles are Deferred intangibles, which 
reflect current investments in future increase in customer 
list, contract and other net intangibles, capitalized 
temporarily shifted
§ Deferred financing fees consists out of transaction fees 
paid at the acquisition of the The Gym Group, they 
amount to c.£29k and are amortized on a straight-line 
basis over 5 years
§ The CAPEX facility indicates further capital needs to 
finance both acquisitions externally, whereas the organic 
openings can be financed majorly throughout the 
generated cash. The facility will be drawn from 2021 to 
2022 and reimbursed by 2024
§ Net income will be fully transferred into the retained 
earnings position implying a steady increase of the 






FYE 31/12 in £k 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Net Property, plant and equipment 164,505          193,472     224,600     366,519     388,887     413,408     452,061     490,800     
Net Intangibles 76,080            261,311     265,150     295,060     311,200     318,241     324,890     331,935     
Deferred Intangibles n.m. 18,669       41,249       6,168         39,724       59,499       59,263       59,442       
Other non-current Assets 454                 -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Deferred Financing Fees n.m. 23,212       17,409       11,606       5,803         -             -             -             
Non-current assets 241,039          496,664          548,408          679,353          745,613          791,148          836,214          882,177          
Inventories 379            525            617            822            924            1,040         1,150         1,256         
Trade receivables 11,912       15,865       18,665       24,844       27,944       31,441       34,774       37,983       
Cash and cash equivalents 3,027         3,053         3,079         3,609         38,620       38,950       44,301       44,680       
Current Assets 15,318       19,443       22,361       29,275       67,488       71,431       80,226       83,919       
Total Assets 256,357     516,107     570,770     708,628     813,102     862,579     916,440     966,096     
Trade and other payables 48,983       60,193       72,943       94,355       109,547     120,799     131,411     141,131     
Other financial liabilities 4,295         -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Revolving credit facility 3,000         7,809         3,531         20              -             7,348         -             23,445       
Provisions 679            -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Total current liabilities 56,957       68,002       76,474       94,376       109,547     128,147     131,411     164,576     
Facility A 10,000       42,746       33,678       24,611       15,544       6,477         -             -             
Facility B 36,000       51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       -             
Facility C -             51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       51,813       -             
Capex facility -             -             -             63,263       95,873       47,937       -             -             
Mezzanine -             29,430       31,343       33,380       35,550       37,860       40,321       42,942       
Loan agreement fees (835)           -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Other financial liabilities -             -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Provisions and other liabilities 4,393         -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Total non-current liabilities 49,558       175,802     168,647     224,880     250,593     195,900     143,947     42,942       
Total Liabilities 106,515     243,804     245,121     319,256     360,140     324,047     275,358     207,519     
Own shares held 48              -             -             -             -             -             -             -             
Fixed Return Instrument 159,474     290,078     326,337     367,129     413,021     464,648     522,729     588,070     
Common Stock 14              14              14              14              14              14              14              14              
Retained Earnings (9,687)        (17,788)      (702)           22,229       39,928       73,870       118,339     170,493     
Reserves (7)               -             -             -             -             -             -             -             






Significant Topline Growth Strengthens the Balance Sheet…
Balance Sheet
(1)
Note: (1) Fixed Return Instrument in 2018 was defined as Share Premium in historicals section, due to publicly traded shares
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Comments Overview(1)
§ The payment terms of the trade and other 
receivables are generally 30 days and consists out 
of customer contracts. Due to granted concessions 
this can vary slightly throughout the year
§ Inventory and trade & other payables have 
payment terms up to a year, large gym equipment 
suppliers such as Matrix grant payment agreements 
such as 10% on delivery and 90% after a further 10 
months. In addition, it is standard market practice for 
landlords of commercial space to reimburse gym 
operators for up to one year's rent if they sign a 15-
year lease contract. These payment arrangements 
have a positive effect on working capital but vanish as 
the entire gym portfolio grow and mature relatively
§ Year-on-Year changes in working capital are 
indicating the pursued strategy of the entire 
investment period. In the year of the envisaged 
acquisitions (2021, 2022) major hikes reflect the 
acquisitions. By the end investment period Y-o-Y 
changes decrease steady due to reduced growth 
expectations
§ Trade & other receivables as well as inventory are 
forecasted based on their last three years average 
according to their related line item, which is revenue 
and SG&A respectively
§ Trade & other payables have been fairly volatile in 
the past. Therefore, it is assumed that the position will 
move towards their last three years median over 
the next three years to mitigate major hikes in working 
capital 
FYE 31/12 in £k 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Working Capital 
Trade & other receivables 11,912 15,865 18,665 24,844 27,944 31,441 34,774 37,983 
Inventory 379 525 617 822 924 1,040 1,150 1,256 
Trade & other payables (48,983) (60,193) (72,943) (94,355) (109,547) (120,799) (131,411) (141,131)
Total Operating Working 
Capital (36,692) (43,804) (53,660) (68,690) (80,678) (88,318) (95,487) (101,892)
+/- Δ in Working Capital (2,264) (7,112) (9,857) (15,030) (11,988) (7,640) (7,169) (6,405)
Line Item Break Down 
A/R as of revenue 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6%
Inventory as of SG&A 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%











…And Leads to Low Working Capital Requirements…
Working Capital
Note: (1) The working capital calculation for the forecast consists solely out of the relevant balance sheet items, a smooth alignment from the past and to the 
future due to other working capital as reported in the past is considered in the forecast
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FYE 31/12 in £k 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Net income 8,924 11,227 17,086 22,931 17,699 33,942 44,469 52,155 
Depreciation & Amortization 21,761 29,695 35,890 42,437 65,994 71,615 77,935 86,404 
Change in Working Capital 5,405 7,112 9,857 15,030 11,988 7,640 7,169 6,405 
Maintenance CAPEX (8,318) (10,725) (12,617) (16,794) (18,890) (21,254) (23,507) (25,676)
Cash flow from operations 27,772 37,309 50,215 63,604 76,792 91,943 106,065 119,287 
Expansion CAPEX (57,551) (28,555) (29,574) (105,439) (54,350) (31,544) (31,418) (32,586)
Cash flow from investing (57,551) (28,555) (29,574) (105,439) (54,350) (31,544) (31,418) (32,586)
Cash Flow before Financing (FCF) (29,779) 8,754 20,641 (41,835) 22,441 60,399 74,648 86,701 
Capex Facility drawdown/(repayment) 12,500 - - 63,263 32,610 (47,937) (47,937) -
Revolver cash drawdown (repayment) 7,809 (4,278) (3,511) (20) 7,348 (7,348) 23,445 
Cash flow available for debt service (17,279) 16,563 16,363 17,917 55,031 19,811 19,363 110,147 
Total Cash interest - (7,496) (7,296) (8,850) (11,336) (10,743) (7,889) (6,521)
Interest Income 22 26 26 28 179 330 354 378 
Cash flow available for debt repayment (17,257) 9,093 9,093 9,096 43,874 9,397 11,828 104,004 
Debt Repayments (1,713) (9,067) (9,067) (9,067) (9,067) (9,067) (6,477) (103,626)
Adjustments (mostl. share proceeds) 21,540 - - - - - - -
Cash Flow 2,570 26 26 28 34,807 330 5,352 378 
Opening Cash Balance 457 3,027 3,053 3,079 3,609 38,620 38,950 44,301 
Cash Increase/(Decrease) 2,570 26 26 530 35,011 330 5,352 378 
Closing Cash Balance 3,027 3,053 3,079 3,609 38,620 38,950 44,301 44,680 
Comments Overview
§ Increased change in Working Capital positions is 
mainly rooted in acquisition of JD gyms and 
Everlast. Those imply increasing rentals and other 
accruals leading to an increased position in trade and 
other payables
§ Cash flows from operations are expected to grow on a 
resilient basis and are additionally boosted by the two 
strategic acquisitions in 2021 and 2022
§ Increasing Expansion Capex in 2021 and 2022 is 
characterized by payments for the acquisition 
targets JD gyms and Everlast. Those are estimated 
to cost £62m and £19m, respectively. Additionally this 
position comprises the conversion of acquired sites 
(£352k per site), the investment in IT (3.5% of 
revenues) and the fit-out of new organically opened 
sites (£1,340k per site).
§ The Capex facility is needed to fund the 
acquisitions in 2021 and 2022. The drawdown and 
payback periods are 2 years 
§ The revolver is continuously needed to ensure short 
term liquidity until 2024
§ Total cash interest includes interest payments for all 
senior and junior loans
§ Besides the years in which the acquisitions are made, 
cash flows available for debt repayments are 
robust and give enough security for reasonable 
leverage
§ The Gym Groups cash balance is steadily positive 

















…As Well as Strong Cash Flows
Cash Flow Statement
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Capital expenditures for equipment Comments
Suppliers
§ Gym equipment like work out and fitness machines are capitalized and listed on the 
Cash Flow statement (Capex attributable to PP&E) as well as on the Balance Sheet 
(Net PP&E)
§ Fit-out Capex is with £1,340k per newly opened gym stable over the investment period
§ In 2021 and 2022 average Capex attributable to PP&E per newly opened site increases 
significantly, because of inorganic opened sites. In order to convert the acquired JD gym 
and Everlast sites into the TGG style, conversion costs accrue. Site conversion Capex 
is assumed to be £352k per newly acquired site.
§ The Gym Group expenses and capitalizes costs related to inventories. Smaller 
gadgets like payments for gymnastic balls, small dumbbells or office supplies are 
expensed. Those expenses have been relatively stable and are expected to be around 
£0.3k per site per annum based on the median of historical figures. Bigger equipment like 
replaced benches and chairs are capitalized on the Balance sheet and are listed under 
inventories and on the Cash Flow statement flow into Maintenance Capex. Average 
inventory expenses per gym is around £2k - £3k over the investment period
§ The Gym Group has cooperation's with premium suppliers for fitness machines and 
provides similar machines in every site. Additionally TGG outsourced the development of 
their own-tailored member management software to two new software partners



























2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Capex attributable to PP&E # of newly opened gyms




























2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Inventory (BS) # of gyms
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8    I Returns
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Base Case
§ The Base case does only consider natural and organic growth. M&A transactions are only 
considered in the Flat and Management case
§ Based on conservative assumptions the Flat case leads to an equity increase of 331% after a 
holding period of 6 years (Entry in beginning of 2019 and Exit in 2024) with an estimated 
entry multiple of 12x EBITDA. This scenario is considered to be the most likely one with a 
probability of 70%
§ The Management case is based on slightly optimistic assumptions that are still likely to occur 
but with a lower probability. If the influencing factors turn out beneficial, the management 
case will lead to an equity increase of 372% after a holding period of 6 years with an 
estimated entry and exit multiple of 12x EBITDA
§ Even in the lower-probability Base case, the equity increase is estimated to be 212% up until 
2024 with an estimated entry and exit multiple of 12x EBIDTA. This provides a comfortable 
situation in a way that the downside is covered as well
Management Case Flat Case
Comments
Strong Returns are Expected in All Cases
Return Overview
EXIT WATERFALL ## 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
EBITDA 51,069       64,318       79,657       99,069       124,063     140,539     157,134     
Exit Multiple ## 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x
EV 612,824     771,822     955,881     1,188,834  1,488,754  1,686,472  1,885,611  
Net Debt (180,557)    (169,099)    (221,291)    (211,973)    (164,298)    (99,646)      (21,708)      
Equity 432,266     602,722     734,590     976,861     1,324,456  1,586,827  1,863,903  
Fixed Return Instrument 290,078     326,337     367,129     413,021     464,648     522,729     588,070     
Ordinary Equity 142,189     276,385     367,460     563,840     859,808     1,064,098  1,275,833  
Sweet Equity 28,438       55,277       73,492       112,768     171,962     212,820     255,167     
Management 1,015         1,972         2,622         4,023         6,135         7,593         9,103         
Institutional Ords 112,737     219,136     291,346     447,049     681,712     843,685     1,011,563  
EXIT WATERFALL ## 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
EBITDA 51,911       65,380       74,114       83,203       93,742       104,104     113,630     
Exit Multiple ## 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x
EV 622,936     784,560     889,367     998,442     1,124,904  1,249,249  1,363,565  
Net Debt (174,010)    (155,781)    (130,312)    (101,058)    (64,533)      (17,472)      37,101       
Equity 448,926     628,779     759,055     897,384     1,060,371  1,231,777  1,400,665  
Fixed Return Instrument 290,078     326,337     367,129     413,021     464,648     522,729     588,070     
Ordinary Equity 158,848     302,442     391,925     484,364     595,723     709,048     812,595     
Sweet Equity 31,770       60,488       78,385       96,873       119,145     141,810     162,519     
Management 1,133         2,158         2,796         3,456         4,251         5,059         5,798         
Institutional Ords 125,945     239,795     310,744     384,035     472,328     562,179     644,278     
EXIT WATERFALL ## 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
EBITDA 50,788       64,027       80,901       102,265     129,454     147,954     169,399     
Exit Multiple ## 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x
EV 609,458     768,320     970,809     1,227,180  1,553,448  1,775,452  2,032,784  
Net Debt (184,216)    (176,277)    (231,037)    (223,535)    (176,250)    (108,960)    (24,245)      
Equity 425,242     592,042     739,772     1,003,645  1,377,198  1,666,492  2,008,539  
Fixed Return Instrument 290,078     326,337     367,129     413,021     464,648     522,729     588,070     
Ordinary Equity 135,164     265,705     372,643     590,625     912,550     1,143,763  1,420,469  
Sweet Equity 27,033       53,141       74,529       118,125     182,510     228,753     284,094     
Management 964            1,896         2,659         4,214         6,511         8,161         10,135       
Institutional Ords 107,167     210,668     295,455     468,286     723,529     906,849     1,126,240  
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Return Breakdown (in £m) 
Exit Waterfall
§ Considering an entry multiple as high as the exit multiple (12x 
EBITDA), the enterprise value increases by £1.27bn (>200%) 
from 2019 to 2025
§ There is a fairly high sweet equity share for the management 
(representing 20.0% of ordinary equity)
§ Management equity incl. sweet equity comprises 1% of the overall 
equity in 2024 providing the management with an exit multiple of 
79.3x (based on 12x EBITDA entry and exit multiple in 2024) 
§ Hence, institutional equity is 99% of the overall equity (accounting 
for 98% fixed return instrument ownership)
Comments
§ Since no multiple arbitrage is assumed in the model, there is no 
value created through this measure
§ Ongoing investments are mainly financed via cash and hence only 
6% of value is created through accumulation of cash (£81.3m)
§ Revenue increased over the holding period by 131% (from 
£165.0m in 2019 to £361.6m in 2024). A huge part of the value is 
created here, namely 61% 
§ The EBITDA margin is also expected to increases by 9p.P. (2019: 
31% to 2024: 40%), this creates 33% of the value (£476.4m)
§ Overall equity increases by £1.14bn between 2019 and 2025
Comments
Enhanced by the Capital Structure, Significant Value is Created for the Sponsors
Return Breakdown
EXIT WATERFALL ## 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
EBITDA 51,069       64,318       79,657       99,069       124,063     140,539     157,134     
Exit Multiple ## 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x 12.0x
EV 612,824     771,822     955,881     1,188,834  1,488,754  1,686,472  1,885,611  
Net Debt (180,557)    (169,099)    (221,291)    (211,973)    (164,298)    (99,646)      (21,708)      
Equity 432,266     602,722     734,590     976,861     1,324,456  1,586,827  1,863,903  
Fixed Return Instrument 290,078     326,337     367,129     413,021     464,648     522,729     588,070     
Ordinary Equity 142,189     276,385     367,460     563,840     859,808     1,064,098  1,275,833  
Sweet Equity 28,438       55,277       73,492       112,768     171,962     212,820     255,167     
Management 1,015         1,972         2,622         4,023         6,135         7,593         9,103         
Institutional Ords 112,737     219,136     291,346     447,049     681,712     843,685     1,011,563  
Equity value
01/01/2019
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MoM Sensitivity Analysis
§ Based on conservative assumptions, the Flat case returns a 
multiple of money of 5.3x after a holding period of 6 years (2019-
2024) with an assumed entry multiple of 12x EBITDA. This 
scenario is considered to be the most likely one with a probability 
of 70%
§ Taking different entry and exit multiples into account (each 9x-15x 
EBITDA), the multiple of money in the Flat case ranges between 
2.9x and 11.2x
§ The Flat case returns an IRR of 32% after a holding period of 6 
years (2019-2024) with an assumed entry and exit multiple of 12x 
EBITDA. This indicates that under pre-mentioned assumptions 
and projections the transaction is favorable for all types of 
investors
§ Applying different entry and exit multiples for the transaction (each 
9x-15x EBITDA), the IRR in the Flat case ranges between 20% 
and 50%
§ As 20% IRR is a common “hurdle rate” for PE funds to decide in 
favor of a potential investment, the transaction is at the higher end 
of an estimated return range of the fund
§ Even if the target would be acquired at a multiple of 15x EBITDA 
and sold at 9x, the deal would still be recommendable as it could  
provide still sufficient returns
§ As all relevant entry and exit scenarios have been considered, 




5.29x 9.0x 10.0x 11.0x 12.0x 13.0x 14.0x 15.0x
9.0x 6.7x 5.4x 4.6x 4.0x 3.5x 3.2x 2.9x
10.0x 7.4x 6.0x 5.1x 4.4x 3.9x 3.5x 3.2x
11.0x 8.2x 6.6x 5.6x 4.9x 4.3x 3.9x 3.5x
12.0x 8.9x 7.2x 6.1x 5.3x 4.7x 4.2x 3.8x
13.0x 9.7x 7.8x 6.6x 5.7x 5.1x 4.5x 4.1x
14.0x 10.4x 8.4x 7.1x 6.2x 5.4x 4.9x 4.4x




0.32x 9.0x 10.0x 11.0x 12.0x 13.0x 14.0x 15.0x
9.0x 37% 33% 29% 26% 23% 21% 20%
10.0x 40% 35% 31% 28% 26% 23% 22%
11.0x 42% 37% 33% 30% 28% 25% 23%
12.0x 44% 39% 35% 32% 29% 27% 25%
13.0x 46% 41% 37% 34% 31% 29% 27%
14.0x 48% 43% 39% 35% 33% 30% 28%




Even with Worse than Expected Multiple Combinations the Profitability is High
Sensitivity Analysis
66January 3rd, 2020Strictly Confidential
Concern Mitigants 




§ Low cost gym market grew 32% annually between 2013-
2018 to >£500m is expected to grow with 11% until 2025
§ Low-cost gym penetration still low at 25% of all gym 
members
§ Opportunity for c. 1,200 -1,400 low-cost gyms (vs. c. 654 in 
2018)
§ Other competitors have tried and failed to gain scale in this 
market (e.g. Sports Direct)
Europe: 
§ Higher penetration (often mid-teens)
§ Historically more widely accepted concept
§ Only really 2 pan-European operators (McFit, Basic-Fit)
Barriers to Scale
§ Scale, brand recognition appropriate site locations
§ Landlord covenants
§ Operational expertise and long successful roll-out track 
record
§ In the UK, the top 3 players operate c. 70% of all facilities
Historical Sentiment 
towards the Sector
§ Highly differentiated low-cost business model does not 
suffer from the issues which characterized legacy gyms
§ Capital is more constrained with lenders more cautious 





§ Embedded EBITDA is inherent in the business model, i.e. 
future growth will be delivered by sites opened historically
§ Predictable cash flows, successfully replicate new gym 
performance, and a reflection of the invested Capex
Quality of Roll-out
§ Rigorous site selection process and quality of the property 
team
§ Strong covenant supports ability to capture best sites
Churn
§ The low-cost model makes churn an opportunity, not a 
concern
§ Flexible offering results in high re-join rates of and a key 
consideration for students and first timers
§ Attrition dynamics in low-cost gyms are fundamentally 
different to a traditional subscription business with a read 
across to other other budget sectors e.g. easyJet and 
Primark
Market Concerns Business Model Concerns
Concerns can be Easily Relativized or Even Mitigated 
Risks of Return Assessment
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9    I Exit Strategy





§ Selling all shares owned to a third party purchaser is the most favorable 
option since strategic buyers can usually pay higher multiples due to 
synergy effects
§ One has to consider the differences between selling to a strategic buyer 
already operating in the UK and one outside the UK willing to enhance his 
footprint
§ IPOs usually achieve the highest multiples but also come with high risks 
due to the duration of the sales process
§ Taking the listed target private now and “reversing” this in a few years 
might send ambiguous signals to the stock market and share prices are 
fairly unpredictable
§ Selling to another PE fund is another viable option for The Gym Group
§ Secondary Sales usually achieve lower multiples than the first two options 
and are thus less favorable
§ There is a high current demand for Fitness and Lifestyle clubs in the PE 
industry TGG could be considered e.g. an add-on for a PE backed buy-
and-built activity in the market, allowing for synergies in a secondary sale
§ The option of liquidation is another one which should not be pursued but 
gives comfort in the worst case scenario
§ Since TGG owns most of its equipment and has long-term rent contracts 
for the buildings in place, the liquidation value should buffer the downside
Exit Option Applicability Preference Likelihood
= low = high low = = high
Strategic Sale to Competitors:
Buyers would be interested, but it is hard
to find a suitable one since on one hand
the antitrust authorities could mitigate a
large player to make the acquisition but
on the other TGG’s EV is unaffordable
for small players. Small players operated
by large parent companies are viable.
Examples:
Strategic Sale to Expanding Foreign 
Operator: 
Large gym operators who are not
currently operating in the UK could use
an acquisition as market entry strategy.
This is probably the most desirable exit
option. Examples:
Strategic Sale Options
Source: Company information, Capital IQ, own analysis
To Maximize Returns and Ease of Realization a Strategic Sale is Preferred
Exit Options
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PE Buy and Build scenario Strategic Expansion Scenario Other potential buyers
Exemplary buyer: Exemplary buyer: 
§ The most preferable option would be an acquisition 
by an PE-backed strategist as part of a buy-and-
built activity
§ This exit would offer the benefits of a secondary 
sale (e.g. negotiations with equal-minded 
professionals, relationship effects, same valuation 
methods, speed, efficiency) as well as synergy 
effects which probably lift the purchase price
§ Since there is currently an high interest in the 
Fitness and Lifestyle industry, there are several 
Private Equity funds that have fitness club 
operators in their portfolio
§ Another desirable exit would be selling the 
business to an European operator that is willing to 
expand to the UK without opening each branch 
from scratch
§ Since TGG is one of the market leaders in the 
United Kingdom and has a strong financial profile, it 
represents a desirable take-over target for strategic 
expansions
§ There are several low-cost operators who are 
pursuing an inorganic growth strategy and 
expectably even more at time of exit in 6 years
Other examples: Other examples: 
Source: Company information, Capital IQ, healthclubmanagement, The Portugal news, Wikipedia, own analysis, IHRS 
owns
owns
§ British PE fund with health & 
wellbeing focus 
§ Already has Viva gym in its 
portfolio which owns Fitness Hut
§ Looked into pure Gym before
§ Has The Bay Club in Portfolio
§ Low-cost gym operator with 290 
facilities in Europe (Germany, 
Italy, Austria, Poland and Spain)
§ Has none in the UK and thus 
might be willing to expand into 
that region
§ Created smaller brand “High-5”
§ Operates 420 clubs in the US, 
they might want to start a 
European footprint
§ Partially owns LA Fitness 
§ Largest and fastest growing 












A Diverse Universe of Buyers would be Interested in a Potential Deal at Exit
Buyer Universe
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10    I Due Diligence







§ What do the expansion / growth strategies of the competitors look like? 
§ Are any international players likely to enter the UK low-cost gym market in the near 
future (e.g. Basic Fit N.V.) ?
§ Are any mergers / acquisitions in the pipeline / expected?
§ How will prices develop depending on intensity of competition
§ Are there any cultural differences (e.g. from the US) that would support higher / lower 
maturity penetration rates?
§ What influence will a potential Brexit have on population growth? (e.g. emigration)
§ What do customers like about the current offering of the gym group? What makes 
them extend / sign a contract?
§ Why have non-customers decided to not join TGG? (preference for competitor, no 
gym membership at all)
§ How will the customer demand for a change in the near / distant future?
§ Are the current owners of identified targets willing to sell? 
§ What are the actual financials of the targets? (Assumption-based modelling)
§ Are the multiples we assumed for the (asset deal) acquisitions feasible?
§ Who would also be interested in acquiring these companies? 
§ Are the any cost or revenue synergies we can assume as further upside potential?
§ Are the potential buyers we identified interested and able to make an acquisition?
§ Are there any revenue or cost synergies that would increase the purchase price if a 
strategic buyer was interested?
§ Up to which size of a buyer would the antitrust authorities confirm / deny a deal?
§ Is an IPO an option? Are there any laws / regulations that prohibit this?
Are the market shares 
assumed obtainable?
Is the market growth we 
calculated realistic?
Is the M&A strategy we 
pursue likely to succeed? 
How is customer demand 
going to develop and what 
are the crucial 
differentiation factors to 
achieve growth targets?
Is the fund able to exit as 
planned?
§ Expert interviews
§ Investor relations of competitors
§ Expert consultants (e.g. 
specialized advisors)
§ Talk to investment banks (sensitive 
with NDAs)
§ Expert interviews
§ Demographic comparison with 
high penetration countries
§ (Public) health institutions
§ General population survey
§ Expert interviews
§ Target segment survey
§ Insights from TGG management
§ Expert consultants (e.g. marketing 
agencies)
§ Expert interviews
§ Target management opinions
§ Broader access to multiple sources
§ Insights into target financials
§ Expert interviews
§ Potential buyer opinions
§ Investor relations of pot. Buyers
§ Legal advisers (antitrust law)
Focus Key Question Deep-dive areas Information Sources Advisers
Source: Company information, own analysis, CCMP
Data Room Access and Further Expert Interaction are Crucial for In-Depth DDs
Due Dilligence Areas
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Process January February March April May June
Teaser Stage
Letter of intent and 
signing of NDA
Data room access










Interaction with current shareholdersInternal DD related
Time Line for Investment Process
Efficient and Fast but Thorough Work Will Lead to Signing in June
Action Plan
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Individual Reflection Jan
A variety of hard skills were required in the project work. On
the one hand, a high degree of analytical skills was required to
perform fundamental corporate finance analysis, valuations,
and on the other hand, financial modelling skills were
sharpened accordingly. The analytical skills had to be
complemented with a conceptual way of thinking, after the
company, market and trend analysis all three components had
to be combined in order to strategically align and further
develop the company. In addition, the relevance for focus on
detail was trained as well as an acceptance that this
perception varies between team members. Also soft skills were
improved, especially the effect of using different management
styles, the willingness to compromise and the trust in the work
of others. Furthermore, the ability to have a more structured
work approach has improved as well as, to question your own
structures and to communicate them better. Regarding the
structuring and the presentation of content, it was a good
lesson to take on more often an outside perspective on my
own work to see if the chosen structure can be comprehend by
others in the same way as it is perceived by me. Additionally,
the entire project work demanded a high degree for
independent knowledge generation and to push people over
and over to help you to receive the information needed. Even
though knowledge provided by books and other university
documents helped to have an initial idea on how to conquer a
task, all of us had to get used to the material to solve problems
appropriately.
Our team approach to project work was in theory efficient but in
practice not as much as imagined. Although we had a relatively late
start, we were able to structure ourselves relatively quickly and put
together appropriate working packages. The company screening was
taken over by everyone and a consensus was reached to decide
which company should finally be "bought". Expert teams were then
formed, two team members focused primarily on market research and
one member was entrusted with company analysis. After the work
packages were completed, each member presented their results to
the team and thus shared its knowledge. The development of the
model was largely approached in a team of two, with one "expert" for
the market and one for the company. The other team member had
taken over model-independent tasks. After the model had been
created, all team members were brought back to the same level of
knowledge and instructed on the function of the model and any
calculation specifics, so that further work packages could be
distributed again. In theory the approach was relatively efficient, but in
retrospect, the knowledge transfer did not run as efficiently as
expected, which is why an even distribution of tasks was not always
possible. The reason for this was the susceptibility to errors in the
knowledge transfer or incorrect knowledge adoption, which led to
increased iteration loops. The key take away from the project in terms
of team approach is, that once a team member builds expertise in a
certain field it is very hard to handover this position to another
member, because appropriate knowledge transfer is the biggest
hurdle, while working in team. Also, a team in the framework of a
master thesis is generally tightened together by common interests,
which is an important matter for a team composition and has to be
thought through carefully. For further projects I would try to mind out
better what are the core skills and core interests of each team
member to share tasks in the team more regarding capabilities and
resources throughout the entire project period.
The format of the master's thesis was the right project to
apply all the knowledge I had gained in the last 1.5 years to
a comprehensive project and to enhance my corporate
finance understanding. Before the Master in Finance I had
studied civil engineering, which is different from the Nova
SBE approach in terms of the approach to solve problems
and the way of learning and working. Therefore I had a very
steep learning curve during this time. On the one hand, the
subjects Corporate Finance, Investments, Applied
Corporate Finance and Private Equity have trained my
understanding for companies, their strategic orientation and
the analysis of markets and sectors. On the other hand, the
previous knowledge was elementary for me to complete an
internship at an investment banking boutique in the
summer, which allowed me to expand my knowledge and to
incorporate it into the work for my thesis. In terms of
working in a team, the whole program at Nova SBE was
very beneficial for me, as I got to know all facets of
teamwork. This learning curve was crucial to keep a cool
head during the master thesis, which was an intense group
project.
All in all the thesis was a great project to apply the gained
knowledge over the entire master journey and a good
preparation for the upcoming professional life. I am happy
and thankful at the same time that NovaSBE and all
professors offered us the opportunity to write the thesis in
such a frame and to support our entire group throughout the
journey.
Skills Developed Team Approach Learnings Applied
